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exchanges, and perhaps get out of this ideowhrojical foreign policy so that we can move to sort of the latin left 3.0, the 1.0 was probably fidel in cuba which i think pretty much went out of, you know, it's been superseded. the second wave is probably hugo chavez. but i think the latin left needs to progress towards a third phase. so perhaps if you combine all of these measures the more innovative social measures and perhaps adherence to more environmental climate change concerns, then the bolivarrian revolution can continue and influence the wider region. >> charlie: many people think that there's little resemblance between chavez and bolivar. >> well, yeah, i think that chavez always made these historical illusions to simon bolivar. i think it was a little bit over the top sometimes. but simon bolivar resonates in venezuela. he united the country. throughout much of the 19th century venezuela was divided politically. you had these regional leaders and the 20th century was dominated by military dictators. venezuela harks back to them and that resonates quite a lot symbolically. that's why
's investment in foreign-policy is national security insurance. there is nothing foreign about foreign policy anymore. smartcan make the small,. w vestments upfront and avoid more costly conflicts and greater burdens down the road. , we'vepast few months seen developments underscore the state -- stakes for having a strong and -- strong american presence in the world. that was a positive step toward stability in the volatile region of the world where we need partnerships. the committee is more than immersed in suyyruiaia. we have treated millions to humanitarian relief -- we have provided millions to humanitarian relief. i expect we will talk about syria somewhat today. having returned from beijing and north koreathe issue took center stage, we are reminded once again that america is the guardian of global security. we should be proud of that. one not turn our back on keys nor will we hesitate what we need to do to defend our allies. if budget is an analyst patient of our values and priorities -- this budget is an illustration of our values and priorities. i have a record of wanting to do defi
issues in difficult american foreign policy. when do we get involved in an atrocity going on within someone else's country. that's a very tough question. would we have intervened in germany in 1938 if we knew what was going on. i think we all like to say we we d have and if we could, would have stopped it. it presupposes and the implication is we have a right do that anywhere in the world if there's an atrocity going on. that a u reflect on little bit? >> thank you, senator. defined one t significant kpant issue -- of militaryal basis intervention in the country. certainly every nation has a themselves in t their own history of self-defense. but to answer your question, you of the dimensions of his that you laid out, as did amplify on psey who cuts back ations and on the quell, when do we do this. what basis? we canthere a frame work follow? y answer is you start with the realities. these are both imperfect different situations. out, i dempsey laid think, rather clearly some of he dimensions of each of the countries in that region. self-interest. you have others who have self-inter
, but it does seem to me that a good part of north korean foreign policy is based on bluster. and so if that is your strategy, you know, maybe -- it's less important that the rockets really work, or maybe they don't work at all. that's less important than if you can make people -- and perhaps your own population -- think that they work. >> could i -- i think steve has made some very, very apt points. this is rocket science, and it's not easy. if there is any good news in this story, and i use that term advisedly, it's the fact that north korea's industrial capacities to test on a regular basis and so forth are probably very constrained. because you don't see -- i'm not trying to say it has to be totally equivalent to the kinds of program that is we ran or the russians ran, but this is not what i would regard as a true testing program, and it's just not frequent enough, it's not intense enough to quantify. that said, the challenge here is maybe less what the north koreans may believe they have. it may be more what we believe they have and how we respond accordingly. and i must say the
Search Results 0 to 11 of about 12 (some duplicates have been removed)

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